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Abstract I explore and analyze a phenomenon (“conversational backoff”) where,
instead of accepting an assertion in the normal way, a speaker challenges its ex-
haustiveness, but not its content. The result is that speakers publicly back off of
the exhaustivity of the claim. These challenges are typically triggered by special
questions of a conditional type, and I focus in particular on the case of “what if”
questions, developing a detailed analysis of their semantics and dynamics.
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1 Introduction
This paper provides an exploration and analysis of a phenomenon that I term conver-
sational backoff. In brief, conversational backoff occurs when discourse participants
discover that they have made different assumptions about what facts might be im-
portant to the truth or falsity of a claim. The result is still a public acceptance of
the claim, but only limited to possibilities that participants determine to be shared
assumptions. Backoff is triggered by a number of linguistic expressions, and espe-
cially various types of questions with a conditional component; these are illustrated
by the A responses:
(1) A: Is Alfonso going to the party?
B: Yes, he is.
A1: Even if Joanna is there?
⇒Will he really go if J. is there?A2: What if Joanna is there?
A3: What about Joanna?
The backoff reading present in A1-3 is approximately, “will he (really) go if Joanna
is there?” This reading is unambiguously present in the “even if” question, but the
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other two types of questions are ambiguous, and I am setting aside other readings
(one that I will refer to occasionally is the ‘what would happen’ reading of the “what
if” question, where A accepts the answer and asks about its consequences.) The
backoff reading in the above examples involves two parts: (i) the questioner accepts
the attempt at an answer for cases where the content of the conditional isn’t true, and
(ii)“re-asks” the original question for cases where it is. Part (i) is the backoff effect
itself, and I propose that in conversational backoff, discourse participants publicly
take B’s attempt at a response to be true, but not exhaustive. That is, backoff serves to
raise the possibility that are some circumstances relevant to a complete (exhaustive)
answer that B might have failed to consider, or excluded but shouldn’t have. There
is a sense in which the backoff response is like a denial or a correction, but it is more
harmonious – in fact on the analysis I develop, it involves only monotonic update to
the public context.
The detailed proposal is that conversational backoff is a repair mechanism to
handle scenarios where speakers discover that they made different assumptions about
what the context is like – in particular, how they chose to implicitly circumscribe the
information taken to be in the common ground. Under one set of the assumptions, a
conversational backoff trigger of the type illustrated above would be vacuous, but
under wider assumptions about the domain, it would not be. The repair mechanism
steps in to readjust the public/joint representation of the discourse context to the
wider domain; in the examples above, on the relevant reading this is forced in order
to avoid vacuity. Formally, backoff turns out to be quite similar to an acceptance
move in the sense of Farkas & Bruce 2010.
In §2 I provide more detail on the scope and commonalities of triggers of
conversational backoff, and their relation to other ‘non-agreeing’ responses. I then
turn to the analysis, where I focus on conditional questions, sketching the idea
informally in §3, and in much more formal detail in §4; backoff itself is implemented
in §4.3. I show more details of how the analysis works by example in §5.
2 Conversational backoff
I will define the class of conversational backoff triggers as those responses that
can trigger limited/restricted acceptance of an interlocutor’s assertion that was not
intended in a limited way.1 The core cases are the various types of conditional-ish
questions illustrated in the introduction: “what if” questions, “even if” questions,
“what about” questions, and of course full conditional questions (which are the
paraphrase for ambiguous examples above):
(2) A: Is Alfonso going to the party?
1 I will focus on assertions in this paper, but backoff responses can target other speech acts.
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B: Yes, he is.
A: Will he (really) go even if Joanna is there?
The important feature of A’s response, again, is that while it doesn’t fully accept B’s
“yes” answer, it doesn’t reject it altogether. Rather, A accepts it but only for cases
that the conditional question is not focusing on.
While in this paper I focus on the conditional question-type of backoff trigger,
there are at least two further kinds to consider.2 First, there are ‘direct’ backoff
triggers that involve asserting that there is another possibility; these typically pre-
suppose that the targeted assertion was intended to exclude the newly identified
possibility. Lewis (1979), in his example 6, discusses such a case (my formatting
into linguist-style examples; see fn. 5 for the full quote):
(3) Lewis’ scenario: “Suppose I am talking with some elected official about the
ways he might deal with an embarrassment. So far, we have been ignoring
those possibilities that would be political suicide for him.”
O: You see, I must either destroy the evidence or else claim that I did it to
stop Communism. What else can I do?
L: There is one other possibility – you can put the public interest first for
once!
Here the backoff response is to a disjunction that was intended as exhaustive
(cued by “either”), and adds a new alternative to those that O identified.
There are also indirect backoff triggers that still do not raise an issue (e.g. ask a
question). These are empirically varied, and many cases involve a possibility modal
(though it isn’t necessarily epistemic), as in A1 below.3 But modality isn’t necessary,
and one can simply mention relevant facts, or raise their possibility in other ways,
illustrated in A2-3 below:
(4) A: Is Alfonso going to the party?
B: Yes, he is.
A1: Joanna might be there.
A2: Will Joanna be there?
A3: He looked a little sick earlier today...
2 Another kind of data I won’t consider here is the interaction of backoff-like responses with other
types of domains: (i) “A: Everyone is going. B: Even John?” (Tamina Stephenson p.c.)
3 Lewis also gives an example of this type, which I won’t focus on because it involves the additional
complication of being a response to a knowledge attribution.
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As with the “what about” case, interpretation of these as a backoff trigger is highly
context-specific, and dependent on relevance reasoning.
A central feature of all of these cases is that conversational backoff can only
target publicly omitted assumptions – it is not licensed if the crucial assumption has
been committed to by a speaker in prior discourse.
(5) A: Is Alfonso going to the party?
B: Yes, he is, even though Joanna might be there.
A: What if Joanna is there? (only what-would-happen reading)
A′: # Even if Joanna is there?
The assumptions in play during conversational backoff are purely implicit.
2.1 Backoff responses and other non-agreeing moves
There are at least two kinds of special “non-agreeing” responses that backoff triggers
might be related to. These are corrections (or more generally, denials) and clarifi-
cation requests. I present clear evidence that they are not corrections. Clarification
requests seem, at this point, to be a somewhat looser category and I don’t know any
diagnostics for it as a whole, so the situation is less clear. Backoff responses seem to
have an affinity with certain kinds of clarification request that involve asking about a
speaker’s assumptions.
There is an intuitive sense in which backoff is used to correct potentially mistaken
assumptions. Aside from this, however, backoff triggers don’t pattern with the class
of corrective responses as they are typically characterized in the literature (van
Leusen 1994; Asher & Gillies 2003; Asher & Lascarides 2003; Maier & van der
Sandt 2003; van Leusen 2004). A typical example of a correction is below:
(6) A: Alfonso is driving to the party.
B: No, he’s WALKING to the party.
I will highlight two reasons to treat backoff responses differently from corrections.
First, corrections can always be marked with “no” (Asher & Gillies 2003; van Leusen
2004), but backoff triggers cannot typically be marked in this way:
(7) B: Alfonso is going to the party.
A: # No, what if Joanna is there?
A: # No, Joanna might be there.
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Second, corrections are by their nature unambiguously incompatible with the
corrected utterance (van Leusen 2004), and backoff responses are not.4 Interestingly,
direct backoff examples as in Lewis’ politician example pattern differently on both
of these criteria, and so might be corrections, but other backoff responses are not.
For this reason my analysis will not deal with direct corrections.
The class of clarification requests (Ginzburg 1998; Purver 2004; Ginzburg to
appear) is somewhat empirically broader and I don’t know of any defining charac-
teristics, but again, intuitively, backoff responses are often used to effectively ask for
clarification of a speaker’s assumptions. Many of the cases discussed by Ginzburg
and others involve clarification of a question/assertion itself:
(8) A: Did Billie show up at all?
B: Billie?
A: Billie Whitechapel. (Ginzburg to appear ex. 17)
Backoff responses never serve this function. But they do seem to pattern more like
clarification requests such as:
(9) B′: Why do you ask?
Furthermore, like other clarification requests, and unlike corrections, backoff re-
sponses don’t put the discourse in a ‘crisis’ state.
In absence of a more strict defining properties for the class, it seems natural to
say that backoff responses are a species of assumption-clarification requests, but not
content-clarification requests. Clearly we are in need of an articulated typology of
non-agreeing responses, and I will leave this for future work.
3 Analysis in brief
Before proceeding to the formal details of the analysis, I’ll sketch the basics infor-
mally. First I discuss “what if” and conditional questions, and then I turn to the
backoff mechanism.
I adopt here the analysis of “what if” questions developed in Rawlins 2010. The
basic idea is that a “what if” question is a conditional question with the issue raised
being supplied anaphorically by a salient question under discussion (QUD; Roberts
1996; Büring 2003 a.o.). In its broad outlines I adopt the analysis of conditional
questions (CQs) from Isaacs & Rawlins 2008 – a CQ involves first assuming the
antecedent, then asking the question in the consequent. Putting these two gives the
“what if” meaning below:
4 Though some might be construed as incompatible in a technical sense, given the details of the analysis
developed later.
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(10) Conditional question update (Isaacs & Rawlins 2008; see also Velissaratou
2000): c+ “if φ , ψ?” = (c+ASSUME φ)+ ?ψ
(11) What-if update (Rawlins 2010): c+“what if φ”= (c+ASSUME φ)+?QUDc
It is important to note that in typical contexts underspecification of the QUD the
speaker has in mind leads to ambiguity of a “what if” question, and many such
readings do not lead to conversational backoff. The core instances of backoff
readings are cases where the QUD is supplied directly by a question that another
speaker has attempted to answer. Therefore, understanding why “what if” questions
trigger backoff is reduced to understanding why conditional questions in general do.
“Even if” questions also can be reduced to CQs – instead of basing their question off
a recently asked question, they base it off a recently made assertion, asking if that
assertion is true even in the “if”-clause circumstances.
How do CQs participate in backoff? Speaker A first asks a question (in the
running example, the polar question “Is Alfonso going to the party?”). B then
proposes a complete answer to this question (e.g. “yes”). If accepted, because this is
a complete answer the context would become ‘uninquisitive’ – no further answering
is necessary. But A now asks a question that would be trivial if B’s answer is in fact
complete (e.g. “What if Joanna is there?”). I will derive this triviality formally in
later sections, but the idea is that this question would already have been answered
if A accepted B’s answer attempt. B infers that A didn’t intend this question to be
trivial, and further infers that A believes there is a mismatch between the way they
were viewing the context. The mismatch concerns what worlds they were taking
into consideration: A thinks B was implicitly setting aside worlds where Joanna is
there (WJ), though they were attending to worlds where Joanna isn’t there (W¬J). A,
on the other hand, was considering both sets of worlds.
This mismatch needs to be resolved somehow, and conversational backoff, I
propose, is the means. Both speakers will in the end take the domain restriction to be
the larger one (including WJ). But B’s attempt at an answer is no longer interpreted
under this wider domain assumption, but rather under the more limited view of the
context that A appears to have been assuming. That is, B’s response is accepted with
the domain restriction that excludes worlds where Joanna is there – for purposes of
interpreting it, speakers temporarily adopt the more restricted context. The update
involved in the conditional question can then proceed in a non-trivial way, as the
question isn’t fully resolved relative to the context with the wider domain. The CQ
would be trivial relative to just the W¬J worlds, but isn’t trivial relative to WJ ∪W¬J .
The idea I will develop is that by asking a CQ, A reveals a defect in the common
ground – B is taken to be assuming a way of making the context precise where
Joanna isn’t there. I take the idea most directly from an example in Lewis 1979,
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where the examples discussed earlier in the paper are explored.5 Interestingly, it is
irrelevant what B’s actual assumptions were, unless they were already made explicit.
Suppose B did in fact consider the possibility that Joanna might be there – their
option for pointing this out is to proceed and answer the CQ. This point is important
to keep in mind – conversational backoff isn’t about private information states, but
rather about public perception of them (cf. Thomason, Stone & DeVault 2006).
4 Conversational backoff in a dynamic semantics
I will analyze conversational backoff on the context of a dynamic semantics for
discourse. Before getting to backoff itself, I synthesize several crucial properties of
the representation of a discourse context, and give a detailed account of conditional
questions. I then turn to the nature of contextual vagueness, and backoff.
4.1 An articulated representation of discourse contexts
The representation of a discourse context needs to be able to handle two issues in
order to be suitable for the analysis of conversational backoff. First, it needs to take
into account the fact that, while we do often operate on mutual public commitments
in the sense of Stalnaker 1978, commitments are at their root made by a particular
speaker, independently of whether other speakers accept them (see e.g. Thomason
2000; Gunlogson 2001). Second, it needs to take into account the related fact that one
interlocutor making a public commitment is a distinct move from others accepting
that commitment into the common ground (Farkas & Bruce 2010).
To handle non-mutual but public commitments, I will use Gunlogson’s commit-
ment sets (Gunlogson 2001, 2008). These can be thought of as a blend of Hamblin’s
(1971) discourse commitment slates with Stalnaker-style context sets. I will tend to
simplify and assume only two interlocutors. (I will notate variables that are part of a
context structure C with a superscript, e.g. csCX .)
(12) Commitment set
csX =
def
{
w |w ∈⋂{p〈s,t〉 |X has publicly committed to p}}
5 Lewis 1979, pp. 354–5, my emphasis: “Suppose I am talking with some elected official about the
ways he might deal with an embarrassment. So far, we have been ignoring those possibilities that
would be political suicide for him. He says: ‘You see, I must either destroy the evidence or else claim
that I did it to stop Communism. What else can I do?’ I rudely reply: ‘There is one other possibility
– you can put the public interest first for once!’ That would be false if the boundary between relevant
and ignored possibilities remained stationary. But it is not false in its context, for hitherto ignored
possibilities come into consideration and make it true. And the boundary, once shifted outward, stays
shifted. If he protests ‘I can’t do that’, he is mistaken.”
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(13) Context structures v.1
A context C involving participants X ,Y is an n-tuple 〈csX ,csY , ...〉.
While it isn’t often analyzed this way, an important empirical observation about
natural language is that assertions don’t take immediate effect. Interlocutors must
tacitly or actively accept them. Tacit acceptance is the typical case, where the
discourse moves forward without comment, but as Farkas & Bruce (2010) point out
(p. 19), there are many overt ways to accept a claim: “One can nod, say uh huh, sure,
right, you bet, yup, etc.” I follow Farkas & Bruce’s treatment of accepting moves6
– instead of the content of an assertion moving directly into an information store,
it is placed in a special slot in the context prior to acceptance. This slot is termed
the table. It is in a sense a generalization of a QUD, as it is updated for all types of
speech acts. Here I use a somewhat simpler formalization of the table than F&B,
since I don’t need its full power.7 (I will implicitly shift between sets and functions
in the formulas below.)
(14) Table A table T is a pair 〈A,Q〉 where A is either an object of type 〈s, t〉,
potentially /0, and Q is either an object of type 〈〈s, t〉t〉, also potentially /0.
(15) Contexts v.2 A context C involving participants X ,Y is an n-tuple
〈T,csX ,csY , ...〉, where T is a table.
A Stalnakerian assertive update would affect the commitment sets directly. Here this
step is decomposed into two; first we put the content of an assertion on the table,
and then a speaker can accept it. (I refer to α here as a sentence radical.)
(16) Assertive update C+[ASSERT α] =
def
〈〈JαK ,QCT 〉,csCX ,csCY , ...〉
(17) Acceptance move v.1 (made by Y)
C+ACCEPT(Y ) =
def
〈〈 /0,QCT 〉,(csCX ∩ACT ),csCY , ...〉
Defined only if ACT 6= /0.
Questioning similarly puts the question on the table; I return to the consequences of
this in much more detail below. I assume that assertion radicals will be of type 〈s,t〉,
and question radicals of type 〈〈s,t〉t〉 (following Hamblin 1973; Karttunen 1977, etc),
so at present all there is between the two slots is a type difference.
(18) Questioning update C+[QUESTION α] =
def
〈〈ACT ,JαK〉,csCX ,csCY , ...〉
Next I turn to the analysis of conditional questions.
6 Though the details here are somewhat different.
7 One crucial factor that I am not explicitly representing is the source of entries on the table.
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4.2 Conditional questions and ‘what if’ questions
Following Isaacs & Rawlins (2008), I take conditional questions to involve an “if”-
clause restricting the domain of a question operator. They propose that an “if”-clause
does this dynamically by introducing a temporary assumption into the context.
(Recall the update sequence sketched earlier: c+ “if φ , ψ?” = (c+ASSUME φ)+
?ψ .) The question now arises how to represent temporary assumptions.
Kaufmann (2000), Isaacs (2007), and Isaacs & Rawlins (2008) use a stack of
context sets to represent temporary assumptions; an assumption involves putting a
copy of the context on top of the stack, and temporarily restricting that copy. Leaving
the temporary assumption involves popping the stack. Here I do something simpler,
suggested as an alternative (but not explored) by Isaacs & Rawlins (2008): I use
temporary assumptions to restrict the view of the current context.8 I don’t provide
arguments one way or the other between the stack approach and the view approach,
but I think for present purposes the view approach is cleaner and easier to understand.
Technically the key difference is that instead of representing assumptions indirectly,
by restricting some context set, I represent them directly as part of the context:
(19) Contexts v.3 A context C involving participants X ,Y is an n-tuple
〈T,a,csX ,csY , ...〉, where T is a table, and a ∈P(W ).
Isaacs & Rawlins (2008), building off of Kaufmann (2000), introduce various
machinery for manipulating stacks of context sets, and here we need analogous
machinery for manipulating temporary assumptions. Basically, all access to any
mutual representation of commitments must be filtered through the a parameter.
Making an assumption and getting rid of temporary assumptions is straightforward:9
(Note that inquisitivity is defined below.)
(20) Assuming C+ASSUME φ =
def
〈〈ACT ,QCT 〉,aC∩ JφK ,csCX ,csCY , ...〉
(21) Popping C+POP =
def
〈〈ACT ,QCT 〉,W ,csCX ,csCY , ...〉
Undefined if C is inquisitive.
The complication comes in from the fact that any acceptance moves must be filtered
through whatever temporary assumptions are currently in play. Here I use an operator
based on Kaufmann’s (2000) ` operator; I refer to this as domain-limited update:
(22) Domain-limited update
x `a p =
def
(x∩ a¯)∪ (x∩a∩ p)
(cf. Kaufmann 2000)
x p
a
8 The sense of the word ‘view’ here is exactly that found in relational databases.
9 One difference from the stack analysis is that here all temporary assumptions are eliminated by
popping, as opposed to the most recent one.
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The picture on the right illustrates the effect of `. Basically, it is a circumscribed
(domain-restricted) assertion operator: inside the domain specified by a, the two
sets are intersected, but outside that domain, x is left intact.10 Acceptance involves
domain-limited update:
(23) Acceptance move v.2 (made by Y)
C+ACCEPT(Y ) =
def
〈〈 /0,QCT 〉,aC,(csCX `aC ACT ),csCY , ...〉
Defined only if csCX ∩aC∩ACT 6= /0 (for all non-Y participants).
Note that if there are no temporary assumptions (a =W ), then the domain-limited
update reduces to standard set intersection.
At this point the standard dynamic treatment of a conditional follows: the
sequence ((c+ASSUME φ)+ψ)+POP is equivalent to e.g. Heim’s (1983) treatment
in terms of the joint context produced.
How do questions interact with temporary assumptions? It is easy to see how
assumptions filter assertions, but less so for questions. Isaacs & Rawlins solve this
problem by representing the assumption only indirectly, in its effect on a temporary
context. I solve this problem here by defining a construct that I will call a GS-context:
(24) The GS-context gC of a context C is:{〈w1,w2〉 |w1,w2 ∈ (csCX ∩ csCY ∩a) and ∀p ∈ QCT : w1 ∈ p↔ w2 ∈ p}
A GS-context is a relation on worlds that are jointly present in the context; it is
guaranteed to be reflexive and symmetric. Recall that I am taking the denotation of
a question radical to always be a (Hamblin) set of propositions, and that asking a
question in C puts its denotation in QCT . If this slot of the table is empty, the second
conjunct is trivially true, and all worlds in the context will be connected. Thus an
empty table is a special case of uninquisitivity (defined below). More interestingly,
if the propositions in this set are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, i.e. form a
partition (see “Hamblin’s Picture”; Hamblin 1958; Groenendijk & Stokhof 1997),
the GS-context forms an equivalence relation. I will assume that this is always so.
(If not, alternatives can overlap a la Velissaratou 2000; Groenendijk & Roelofsen
2009.) This equivalence relation is exactly the kind used as a question meaning by
Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984), and used directly in the representation of a context
by Groenendijk (1999). Here I treat the Hamblin-style representation as primary and
derive the G&S version. Using this construct some standard notions can be defined
following Groenendijk (1999) most directly.11
10 Kaufmann’s paraphrase for a similar operator may be helpful, if a is thought of as a context also: we
learn in a context x that context a supports p.
11 This is not to say that the GS-context is necessary for defining these properties, but it is both
convenient and demonstrates the connection to Groenendijk’s dynamics. While some might argue
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(25) Inquisitiveness
a. A G-context g is inquisitive iff ∃w1,w2 s.t. 〈w1,w1〉 ∈ g∧ 〈w2,w2〉 ∈
g∧〈w1,w2〉 6∈ g.
b. A context C is inquisitive iff gC is inquisitive.
(26) A question move in context C resulting in C′ is trivial iff gC = gC′ .
(27) An assertion move α is completely resolving in a context C if, for some X ,
gC+α+ACCEPT(X) is uninquisitive. (I will call α a complete answer in that
context.)
Groenendijk’s notion of “licensing” and so on could be adapted, but I will not
do this formally here; I take it that an assertion is licensed in an inquisitive context
(at least) if it contributes to answering the question on the table in some way. Note
that when these definitions are combined with the POP operator above, the system
requires a question to be completely resolved (or otherwise dispensed with) before
abandoning the temporary assumption; this is the same as in Isaacs & Rawlins. (In
fact, gC corresponds directly to the top element of the stack in the I&R analysis.)
The formalism so far is enough to characterize a conditional question update:
(28) C+ [If Joanna goes to the party, will Alfonso go?] =
(C+ [ASSUME J. goes to the party])+ [QUESTION A. goes to the party?]
The assumption step reduces aC to only worlds where Joanna goes to the party,
and the question puts the set {λw . A. goes to the party, λw . A. doesn’t go} (the
denotation of the question radical) on the table. Because the GS-Context is sensitive
to temporary assumptions, it is an equivalence relation on worlds jointly in the
context that are also in the restricted aC. In this example, the GS-context connects
worlds just in case they resolve the issue of whether Alfonso goes to the party in the
same way. A subsequent answer is also filtered through the assumption, and so will
only address the issue relative to worlds where Joanna does go to the party.
The treatment of “what if” questions follows, though I haven’t fully explicated
the notion of QUD in this framework. But a question on the table is certainly the
most immediate QUD, and this is the case that leads to backoff. “What about”
questions are a complicated issue that I leave for later work, but they can be analyzed
as conditional questions where the conditional clause is reconstructed by relevance
reasoning from the content of the “about” clause. “Even if” questions have a
straightforward analysis in this framework: they involve asking whether the assertion
radical on the table is true even in the case identified by the “if”-clause. (A piece of
that it is overly complex to use both kinds of representations, I take each to be a different side of the
same coin.
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evidence for this approach is that they are polar in nature, always licensing “yes”
and “no”, unlike “what if” questions.)12
4.3 Contextual vagueness and backoff
I have claimed that in cases where backoff is triggered, it is because speakers
make different assumptions about how to circumscribe the context. The following
implements this idea.13 The idea follows Gunlogson’s (2001) notion of a reduction
set. Gunlogson defines a reduction set to express the ways in which a context might
evolve, but I use it here to express ways that a context might already be.
(29) R is an accessibility relation between contexts C,C′ such that 〈C,C′〉 ∈ R iff
(i) csC
′
X ∈P(csCX) and csC
′
Y ∈P(csCY ),
(ii) C′ is not empty,
and (iii) TC = TC
′
and aC = aC
′
(30) R(C) =
def
{C′ | 〈C,C′〉 ∈ R}
Two contexts are related just in case the second contains more information than
the first, but other parameters are held equal (clause iii, the main difference from
Gunlogson’s definition). A particular member of the reduction setR represents an
information state that a discourse participant is tacitly assuming the context to be,
despite lack of public commitments to that effect. I will refer members ofR(C) as
prunings of C. What constrains a discourse participant’s choice of prunings? The
overt part of the analysis is that any public commitments constrain the reduction set.
Other than that, since prunings are non-public (and I have chosen not to represent
them as part of the context), we do not get direct access. We can, of course, reason
about what other speakers’ prunings must be.
Stalnaker introduced the notion of a defective context as one where speakers’
assumptions are mismatched. Several kinds of defectiveness emerge on the present
system. First-order defectiveness is where speakers commitment sets don’t intersect.
The more interesting case of second-order defectiveness involves mismatches in
the tacit prunings of the context, for instance if (csPrX (C)X ∩ csPrX (C)Y ) 6= (csPrY (C)X ∩
csPrY (C)Y ). I will term a pruning-only mismatch as one where prunings of C differ by
some proposition p that is not decided by the actual context C. This is a species of
second-order defectiveness. It can occur if someone has forgotten a relevant fact,
12 One complication for “even” and “what if” questions is how their update proceeds if backoff clears
the table (see below). I assume that the anaphoric content in each is reconstructed prior to application
of the repair mechanism.
13 There are many other implementation options to consider, and I will not try to choose between them
here.
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or incorrectly assumed that some fact wasn’t relevant to the issue at hand. The
following operator is useful for stating the precise conditions for such a mismatch:
(31) Unsettledness test: (c, p) = 1 iff c∩ p 6= /0∧ c∩ p 6= p
i.e. true iff c does not settle whether p is true.
So a pruning-only mismatch happens when (csCX ∩ csCY , p), and ∃Z : (csPrZ(C)X ∩
csPrZ(C)Y , p), but ∃Z′ : ¬ (csPrZ′(C)X ∩ csPrZ′(C)Y , p).
Conversational backoff is conditioned on the discovery of a pruning-only mis-
match. It is designed to allow questions that would be trivial if a proposed assertion
is accepted to be interpreted non-trivially.
(32) Conversational backoff repair If assertion radical p is on the Table in C
due to a move by speaker X , and speakers discover a pruning-only mismatch
on proposition q, then they can shift to a new context C′:
C′ = 〈〈 /0, /0〉,aC,(csCX `(ac∩¬q) p),csCY 〉
Furthermore, all speakers Z are now publicly committed to (csPrZ(C)Z ,q).
This repair does two things: it clears the table, and performs a domain-limited update
with the assertion radical that was on the table. The domain is limited to the case
where the mismatched proposition is false. The precondition is that there is already
some assertion radical on the table, i.e. someone has made an assertion that hasn’t
been accepted. Formally speaking, backoff closely resembles the acceptance move
in (23), except that p is not accepted relative to the full context.
This repair mechanism sets the stage for a successful conditional question update
(though it can be triggered in other ways); such an update will typically proceed by
assuming q, and asking a question that is only non-trivial as long as q could be true.
It is important to note that the choice of q is a wild-card in this system, and I leave a
full exploration of how speakers reason about q to future work. I do assume that it
must be signaled in some more or less direct way by the triggering move.
5 Consequences and examples
Before going through a backoff case, I’ll step through how a basic question-answer-
accept sequence works (which is very similar to Farkas & Bruce 2010).
(33) A: Is Alfonso going to the party?
B: Yes, he is. A: Ok.
First we update the input context with the question. This puts the content of the
question (a size-two set of propositions) on the table. This renders the GS-context
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inquisitive. For example, supposing that (i) Alfonso goes in w1,w2 but not in w3,w4,
(ii) these are all the worlds, (iii) A and B have no prior public commitments (csCA
and csCB each start with all four worlds, i.e. = {w1,w2,w3,w4}), and notating the
contents of the table as sets in this domain rather than functions:
(34) C = 〈〈 /0, /0〉,W ,csCA,csCB〉
gC =

〈w1,w1〉 〈w2,w1〉 〈w3,w1〉 〈w4,w1〉
〈w1,w2〉 〈w2,w2〉 〈w3,w2〉 〈w4,w2〉
〈w1,w3〉 〈w2,w3〉 〈w3,w3〉 〈w4,w3〉
〈w1,w4〉 〈w2,w4〉 〈w3,w4〉 〈w4,w4〉

(35) C2 =C+ “Is Alfonso going to the party?” =
〈〈 /0,{{w1,w2},{w3,w4}}〉,W ,csCA,csCB〉
gC2 =

〈w1,w1〉 〈w2,w1〉
〈w1,w2〉 〈w2,w2〉
〈w3,w3〉 〈w4,w3〉
〈w3,w4〉 〈w4,w4〉

B’s attempt at an answer is a complete answer by the definition above, and so (if
accepted) would leave the context uninquisitive. In this example I have shown an
overt acceptance move, which I take it triggers the ACCEPT update. The assertion
update does not change the GS-context, but accepting does.
(36) C3 =C2+ “Yes, he is [going to the party]" =
〈〈{w1,w2},{{w1,w2},{w3,w4}}〉,W ,csCA,csCB〉
gC3 = gC2
(37) C4 =C3+ACCEPT(A) =
〈 /0,{{w1,w2},{w3,w4}},W ,csCA,(csCB ∩{w1,w2})〉
gC4 =
{
〈w1,w1〉 〈w2,w1〉
〈w1,w2〉 〈w2,w2〉
}
A accepting the answer ensures that B’s commitment set contains no more than
worlds 1 and 2. Since the intersection of the commitment sets determines the domain
of the GS-context, this ensures that the context is uninquisitive. Note that this is
true even though the question remains on the table. (We might want acceptance
of a complete answer to clear the table completely, but I will leave this issue aside
as it isn’t necessary for the data I’m dealing with. This issue is somewhat more
complicated than it might presently appear, as the real question is how long and
under what conditions do QUDs persist.)
I turn now to the case of the conditional question discourse that triggers backoff:
(38) A: Is Alfonso going to the party?
B: Yes, he is.
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A: Will he go if Joanna is there?
Here, instead of an overt acceptance move, A asks a conditional question. There are
two possibilities to consider. First, the CQ might be preceded by a covert ACCEPT.
Second, it might not be. Each of these cases turns out to involve trivial questioning,
and conversational backoff can repair the second case. I will leave the details of the
first case to the reader, but the way it works is as follows. In C4 above (the input
context to the CQ in this case) the question of whether Alfonso goes is completely
resolved. The conditional question involves first assuming that Joanna is at the party,
and then asking whether he will go. Even after making this assumption the question
remains resolved, and asking the question does not affect the GS-context, rendering
the questioning trivial.
If a hearer assumes no covert acceptance move, then the divergence from the
above example starts at C3. Let us assume that Joanna is at the party in w1,w3 and
not at w2,w4. (Note that the singleton nature of the alternatives is simply an artifact
of choosing for expository purposes such a small domain of worlds.)
(39) C5 =C3+ [ASSUME “Joanna is there"] =
〈〈{w1,w2},{{w1,w2},{w3,w4}}〉,aC5 = {w1,w3},csCA,csCB〉
gC5 =
{
〈w1,w1〉
〈w3,w3〉
}
After the assumption the context remains inquisitive – it is still at issue whether
Alfonso goes to the party, exactly because A has not accepted the answer. But the
next step of the conditional question update tries to raise exactly that issue. Since
the only remaining worlds, w1 and w3 are already disconnected, asking the question
component of the CQ would be trivial – the GS-context would be unchanged.
The first case doesn’t meet the preconditions for conversational backoff, because
there was no proposition on the table. Here, however, there is: B’s attempt at an
answer remains waiting. Furthermore, a hearer can infer that A must not have
believed the conditional question to actually be trivial. There is no way to repair
the case where the answer is fully accepted and handle this inference, but as long
as there is a way to apply backoff, we can handle this inference for the case where
the answer isn’t fully accepted. In particular, the hearer can reason that A thinks
that the two are assuming different prunings of the context (which is not defective in
any first-order way). Further, A doesn’t mean to simply ignore B’s answer. Given
the constraint that a pruning-only mismatch must be signaled by an overt move,
the proposition in the antecedent provides an obvious candidate for the difference
between the two implicit prunings of the context. (As noted earlier, much more than
I am saying here needs to be said about how this difference is inferred.)
The repair then is to accept the answer into B’s commitment set, but only relative
to the domain imposed by this inferred minimal difference between ways of making
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the context precise (e.g. prunings). Where q is the proposition that Joanna is there:
(40) C6 = BACKOFF(C3,q) = 〈〈 /0, /0〉,aC3,csCA,{w1,w2,w3}〉
In the repaired context we have learned that B is committed to Alfonso going to
the party under the assumption that Joanna is not there, but we have not learned
about B’s commitments otherwise. That is, we have removed w4 (where Alfonso
does not go and Joanna is not there) from B’s commitment set, but not w2, where
Alfonso does not go and Joanna is there. If accepted straightforwardly (as in C4 in
the first example) both worlds would have been removed. This repair sets the stage
for a non-trivial interpretation of the conditional question asked by A, by leaving
enough worlds that the question can be asked non-trivially, and at the same time
clearing the table. The intuition behind the clearing of the table is that B, at the time
of answering, believed themselves to be fully discharging their answering duty.
(41) C7 =C6+ [ASSUME “Joanna is there”] =
〈〈 /0, /0〉,aC7 = {w1,w3},csCA,{w1,w2,w3}〉
gC7 =
{
〈w1,w1〉 〈w3,w1〉
〈w1,w3〉 〈w3,w3〉
}
(42) C8 =C7+ [QUESTION “Will Alfonso go?”] =
〈〈 /0,{{w1,w2},{w3,w4}}〉,aC8 = {w1,w3},csCA,{w1,w2,w3}〉
gC8 =
{
〈w1,w1〉
〈w3,w3〉
}
In the end result, there is a temporary assumption and the context is inquisitive.
An answer relative to that temporary assumption is independent of the domain-
limited answer accepted by the conversational backoff repair.
6 Conclusions
In this paper I have presented a case study of a previously unnoticed ‘non-agreeing’
but ultimately monotonic response type, and the reasoning it triggers. The analysis I
have developed involves reasoning about tacit ways that speakers might be making
the context more precise – conversational backoff is triggered by a mismatch in these
precisifications, though the public context itself is not defective. I have focused on
conditional questions of various flavors, and shown that they are especially suited
to triggering backoff. The analysis itself, though it might seem complex, is largely
composed of pieces that are each independently motivated – the two novelties are the
synthesis of these pieces, and the proposed conversational backoff repair mechanism
itself. One major result of this paper is to show that conversational backoff is
actually a species of acceptance; it is a qualified acceptance, rather than the normal
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unqualified acceptance. Lewis’ idea was that a mechanism of this type was a type of
accommodation – how does this stack up? Backoff fits into the mold of ‘enlightened’
accommodation in the sense of Thomason et al. 2006 – an update that involves
public recognition and negotiation about the nature of private commitments. It also
resembles Bonomi’s (2006) ‘discommodation’, which involves a suspension of a
view of the common ground when there is a mismatch between private and public
information. But it isn’t quite the same as either, and it is clear that the typology of
non-agreeing moves and repairs is rich, and barely explored; much work remains!
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